Why have so many predictions about the war in Ukraine over the past 12 months turned out to be spectacularly wrong? It makes sense to go through the “unfulfilled prophecies” on this tragic anniversary of the invasion. Otherwise we risk falling for it again if we continue to be prisoners of the same mechanisms that misled us the first time. I will try to list chapter by chapter the main denials that reality has imposed on our prejudices.
1) Easy and quick victory for Putin.
That was the most widespread opinion a year ago. That was one of the reasons many Western leaders were willing to cede anything and everything to Russia: starting with a Ukrainian neutrality that left it to the fate of the Moscow satellite state. Where did this prediction come from, which was swept away by the Ukrainian resistance? From an overestimation of the Russian armed forces, coupled with some exploits (Chechnya, Georgia, Syria), little and poorly studied. On an underestimation of Ukrainian nationalism: Many believed Putin’s propaganda that Ukraine was never a real nation but just an offshoot of Russia. And that’s why they should have welcomed Putin’s army with open arms, at least in some regions. Historical ignorance and pro-Russian prejudice have contributed to this. To avoid repeating the same mistakes over and over again, you must select your sources of information and remember who the false prophets were. A warning is useful for the Italian public: in our national history there are rich deposits of pro-Russian and anti-Western prejudices, based on majority political traditions (fascism, communism, a certain Catholicism) for which false prophets have a predisposition to listen to them and forgive them all their mistakes. Beware of the opposite risk. A year full of negative surprises for the Russian armed forces should not lead us to believe that Putin’s generals cannot learn from their mistakes and correct their course. As for the Ukrainian resistance, we know how much it needs Western military aid and how much NATO arsenals have been reduced by thirty years of disarmament.
2) Energy Apocalypse.
A year and months ago after the start of the invasion, many described a Europe on the brink of dire energy shortages, doomed to a winter of cold and hunger. There have been increases in energy tariffs, they have hit household and corporate balance sheets hard, but this crisis was shorter and much less tragic than expected. The relatively mild winter was a factor, but not the most important. European countries have shown flexibility in diversifying their sources by looking elsewhere for energy. The business system has responded by accelerating energy savings and innovation. Thanks to public budgets, the weakest sections of society were helped. Why so many alarming and disastrous predictions? Because we tend to underestimate the wealth of our own countries. Today we have many more resources than, for example, the first energy shock of the 1970s. We also tend to underestimate the elasticity of the market economy, which reacts quickly to price increases or shortages. Finally, we underestimate the responsiveness of democratic political systems. A common misconception holds that dictatorships are better able to withstand prolonged war efforts, but history does not support this theorem.
3) Food Apocalypse.
The same as above. Sometime in 2022, famine seemed to be raging on Italy’s doorstep. The usual apocalyptic – and perhaps pro-Russian – reflex portrayed Russian grain production as vital to such an extent that the whole world was sliding toward starvation. But Russia had no interest in halting its grain sales. And to the extent that these have shrunk because war hampered logistics, the world must compensate for many other agricultural superpowers (key producers include the United States, Canada, Argentina, Brazil, Australia and even amazing India). There have been price increases, with poor countries being hit the hardest. But so far we have not seen the apocalypse on this front either, announced in the form of revolutions, mass migrations. It is good to remember this fact: we are eight billion on the planet, but agricultural production can feed ten billion people. Poverty, not scarcity, is why there are still hundreds of millions of undernourished and malnourished people. Poverty and inequality existed before this war.
4) Sanctions will force Russia to the negotiating table.
International sanctions have failed in Ethiopia since the days of Mussolini. Fascist Italy did not change its foreign policy because it was subject to a regime of sanctions. The same goes for Cuba, North Korea, Iran. All of these countries have also found ways to circumvent the embargo, at least partially, let alone if Russia wasn’t willing to do the same. Perhaps the only truly relevant case of successful sanctions was their application against apartheid in South Africa: in this case, however, international isolation was combined with a powerful internal liberation movement led by Nelson Mandela. In addition, the sanctions regime against Russia today sees the entire West with important allies like Japan, South Korea, but a large part of the world including a pro-Western power like India, the Persian Gulf, Africa and Latin America does not participate in our sanctions regime. What was once called the Third World and today is not necessarily synonymous with poverty, but with “non-aligned” still sees war primarily as an East-West conflict in which the “big South” has no interests and therefore sees no need to take sides.
6) Putin will use nuclear weapons.
He has threatened her several times, but is that a credible threat? Among the contraindications, American experts point out that tactical nuclear weapons, used on a battlefield with tight forces, can sow death and destruction even among Russian soldiers. At the mercy of the winds, radioactivity can return to Russian territory. It is certainly a sign that should be taken seriously that Putin has suspended the New Start treaty limiting nuclear weapons. In fact, however, he had exposed them well before the war, using the pandemic as an excuse to deny American inspectors access.
7) Putin is about to disappear: coup d’etat or terminal illness.
Another prophecy that circulates regularly and is just as regularly forgotten. We all saw him cheering over a huge crowd at the mega-rally in Moscow two days ago. He did not look like a sick man, nor besieged by opponents. The only visible attacks against him inside Russia come from right-wing nationalist hawks like the head of the Wagner division. That he tolerates them leaves one guessing: that he himself is trying to fool the West into believing that his overthrow will be followed by an even more aggressive regime. In any case, behind this prophecy (death or coup) is also the belief or hope that Putin is the only real problem. That means not reconciling the pathological, paranoid dimension of a Russian imperialism that has also taken root in popular culture. After 1945, Nazi Germany had to “re-educate” itself in order to rid itself of a widespread disease that was not only reserved for Adolf Hitler and which was already clearly visible in the First Reich.