A presidential inauguration ceremony was held on that August 7th, marking a milestone and record in this type of ideological alignment on the continent. The new Colombian President Gustavo Petro was sworn in. This removed another barrier that the continent’s socialists considered almost insurmountable. It was the third. It had previously happened a year ago with Pedro Castillo taking power in Peru, where Ollanta Umala had become a major frustration in 2011.
And even before that, another celebratory milestone had arrived for the socialists of the 21st century. It happened in December 2018, no less than in Mexico. Andrés Manuel López Obrador provided the impetus because the second Latin American economy entered left orbit. He had come very close in 2012, which had also dashed the illusions of his peers in the rest of the continent.
Like López Obrador, Petro, who in his youth was a member of the M-19 (an urban guerrilla demobilized in the late 1980s), came to the Casa de Nariño after rising to various leadership positions in his country. His political career made him from the Congress and Mayoralty of Bogotá (2012-2015) to the main opposition figure of the conservative Álvaro Uribe and his political project.
During these two decades, more than one left-wing analyst has noted the strength of the Colombian right, and some are not lacking in an attitude of resignation. Additionally, Petro was rejected by the media and voters for years because he was a left-wing politician and a primary opponent of Uribe in Colombia, a country where political discourse attempted to link the left with the guerrilla and Chavista regime in neighboring Venezuela . But eventually Petro managed to rally citizens’ dissatisfaction in the face of the almost unpopular management of Iván Duque, the last Uribe dolphin in the Colombian political system.
The biggest challenge for the new president is to politically bear the cost of the difference between what was promised during the campaign and what is possible given the critical global economic situation. And on the scene also begins the challenges of the continent’s other left-wing governments, arguably the largest number in history.
historical alignment
In this context, Petro’s rise to power is inevitable as another move in the perennial chess being played at the regional level between the less and less clear tendencies of the left or the right.
The regional ideological shifts are already reminiscent of the past decades. For example, half a century ago, in times of clearer ideas and lines, Salvador Allende in Chile, Juan José Torres in Bolivia, Juan Velazco Alvarado in Peru, as well as strong tremors in other countries, marked a moment of special rapprochement with Cuba for the Castro brothers.
Then, at the beginning of the 21st century, Latin America experienced a political cycle marked by the rise to power of left-wing political parties. Coinciding with an economic boom between 2003 and 2011 thanks to the rise in commodity prices, these governments managed to consolidate and increase their electoral support. In some cases, they also made constitutional changes that allowed them to stay for consecutive terms. These were notably the cases of Venezuela, Bolivia, Ecuador, Nicaragua and Argentina.
The nascent governments of Latin America in the first decade of the 21st century were representative manifestations of the so-called “Left Turn”. These governments also emerged in an external context characterized by a relative withdrawal from the region by the United States and the increasing influence of other external actors, notably China and, to a lesser extent, Russia and Iran.
“Carnivore” and “Vegetarian”
Two were the main characteristics of this ideological-political cycle: its ideological heterogeneity and its political stability. In terms of ideology, there have been three variants within the universe of the political left in the region: a more radical wing dubbed the “flesh-eating left,” which is additionally composed of the governments of Venezuela, Bolivia, Ecuador, Paraguay, Cuba and Nicaragua. A second, with temperate characteristics, composed of Brazil, Uruguay and Chile, called the “vegetarian left”. Finally, a third, particularly represented by Argentina, which was more moderate at the beginning and more radical at other times.
In each case, more or less relationships with global markets, a more or less great hegemony in relation to the constituted powers, and finally the characteristics of the democratic relationship and the debate between internal political tendencies were noted.
From recovery to bankruptcy
In the middle of the last decade, however, there was a political erosion of these governments and the electoral victory of several right-wing parties. The reasons for this change include the fall in raw material prices and the associated economic impact in the region, as well as the increasing corruption scandals. At the time, some analysts spoke of the beginning of a new economic and political cycle, of a turn to the right.
This round, however, had a summer flavor. The return actions multiplied and surprised. Peronism soon returned to Argentina in 2019 with Alberto Fernández and Cristina Kirchner. Gabriel Boric shocked Chile in March 2022. Petro did something even more notorious in Colombia a few weeks ago. Added to this is the possible return of Lula da Silva to the Brazilian presidency in the elections in October this year. In fact, the latest polls show him with a stunning lead of more than 10 points over a worn-out Jair Bolsonaro.
However, the conditions of political stability that the new scenario will have are not yet clear. In the first round experienced by the region, nine out of 16 leaders elected in 2003-2015 completed their mandate within the set deadlines; two remain in their previous positions (Daniel Ortega in Nicaragua and Nicolás Maduro in Venezuela). They cling to the iron line of a regime established 60 years ago, namely Diaz Canel’s Cuba. One died in his fourth term (Hugo Chávez in Venezuela), one resigned at the end of his third term (Evo Morales in Bolivia), two presidents were impeached (Dilma Rousseff during his second term and Fernando Lugo in Paraguay) and one was ousted dismissed by the legislature (Manuel Zelaya in Honduras).
tired folks
In the new political cycle that has arrived in the region, if the victory of Lula da Silva is confirmed, a unique panorama is presented in which the five main economies of the region are governed by parties, fronts or coalitions of different expressions the regional left: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia and Mexico. There are also such cases as Peru and Honduras, alien to a strong political tradition of the left, and the chronic cases of Cuba, Nicaragua and Venezuela. An incident between the two that portrays the Bolivian with a quasi-continuity that has only changed for a year but has been maintained among other characteristics since 2020.
As with the previous wave, the panorama of the regional left is heterogeneous in terms of the structure of government forces. On the one hand, the Bolivarian branch, composed of Cuba, Nicaragua and Venezuela, is maintained. On the other hand, there are the countries where disputes arose between those wanting to return or enter the country and their heirs or godchildren (Alberto Fernández and Cristina Fernández in Argentina; Evo Morales and Luis Arce in Bolivia; Vladimir Cerón and Pedro Castillo in Peru ). A duality that had a notable precedent when Lenin Moreno interfered with Rafael Correa’s plans in Ecuador. A country where the erosion of right-wing Guillermo Lazo could at any time today provoke an expansion of left-continental bias.
The third group in this sense are Andrés Manuel López Obrador in Mexico; probably Lula da Silva in Brazil, Gustavo Petro in Colombia and Gabriel Boric in Chile. There is no certainty that the powerful economic structures associated with global capitalism in each of these countries can be shaken by these governments. This hypothetical shock would no doubt have strong aftershocks in the rest of the continent.
In parallel, however, the new turning point coincides with electoral cycles characterized by the successive punishment of governing parties with different conditions and tendencies. This was experienced first by Evo Morales and then by Jeanine Áñez in Bolivia, then by Correa, Moreno and Lazzo in Ecuador. And the anti-official climate goes hand in hand with declining social tolerance and shorter “honeymoons” for the new governing parties. Such are the experiences of Pedro Castillo in Peru, of Gabriel Boric himself in Chile and the defeat of the Frente de Todos in last year’s general elections in Argentina.
The exceptions are those of Daniel Ortega in Nicaragua; Maduro in Venezuela and Diaz Canel in Cuba. But it is clear that these are cases classified under the parameters of authoritarianism rather than a minimum of representative democratic space. In short, there is a historic turn to the left in Latin America; However, it is not known what material the plinths are made of, which gives an idea of the time of their current validity.