interview
Ammunition shortages are forcing the Ukrainian army to go on the defensive in the war against Russia, says military analyst Hendrik Remmel. But how can Ukraine go on the offensive – and what does the West understand by a victory for Kiev?
tagesschau.de: On the second anniversary of the attack on Ukraine, the Ukrainian army must withdraw from the city of Avdiivka, which has been fought for months. What does this withdrawal represent?
Henrik Remmel: The situation of the Ukrainian army is precarious at the beginning of the third year of war. But the loss of Avdiivka will not decide the outcome of the war. Avdiivka was relevant for the Ukrainian army as a favorable starting point for an attack on the city of Donetsk. This is another reason why it is not insignificant for the Russian armed forces, at least on an operational level, that they took this city. The latter also allows for further attacks to the west, especially on the Pokrovsk transport hub and, if necessary, the subsequent outflanking of Ukrainian forces in the Sloviansk and Kramatorsk area. But believing that capturing the Russian army would be a strategic game changer is a mistake from a military point of view.
“It’s mainly a matter of wear and tear”
tagesschau.de: Can we expect the Russian armed forces to now rapidly advance west or northwest?
Remel: The possibility exists. But the Russian armed forces, like the Ukrainian ones, have been unable to quickly gain large amounts of space in recent years. There was an exception in the Kharkiv area, where the Ukrainians took advantage of weak Russian defenses and a campaign of deception in the information space. But basically both sides are mainly concerned about attrition. The focus is more on how to destroy the largest groupings of forces possible, also because space-oriented strike operations require an extremely high level of training and equipment, which neither side can currently provide to the extent necessary.
If the Russian armed forces had planned to build on the success of the attack on Avdiivka and the surrounding area and advance further west, then ideally they would have already done so immediately after the Ukrainian units withdrew; We should have already realized this. The fact that Russian armed forces are spreading rather than concentrating in the area in question discourages a major operational push towards the West in the near future. This is also due to the fact that the Ukrainian armed forces are prepared for this situation and have established control positions west of Avdiivka, which makes a large-scale Russian operation towards the west more difficult.
Desperate search in the world market
tagesschau.de: A war of attrition requires ammunition and soldiers. What does Ukraine need to achieve in these areas to get through what is expected to be a difficult year in 2024?
Remel: It can be assumed that Ukraine will have to be strategically on the defensive this year, also because it does not have enough ammunition. We know that, for example, not enough artillery ammunition is being delivered from the West. Production rates are increasing and people are desperately trying to acquire artillery ammunition on the world market. But it is very unlikely that the Ukrainian military will be able to balance this rate of fire war in the near future.
For person
Hendrik Remmel is a research associate at the German Institute for Defense and Strategic Studies (GIDS) in Hamburg. His focus is on conflict analysis and investigating Germany's strategic culture. The military analyst has several years of experience as a combat troop officer in the Bundeswehr. His study “The US as a Geostrategic Actor in the Ukraine War” was published last month.
The advantages of defense
tagesschau.de: And that's why it makes sense to be defensive?
Remel: When you act militarily defensively, you need fewer personnel and less material, because you do not need to actively move tactically, you do not need to hold newly gained ground with additional forces, and you do not need to prepare your moves with fire. . Therefore, given the current personnel and material situation, it makes sense to remain on the defensive at least until the ammunition situation improves again. This also allows you to rotate units that have been in combat for a long time, train them and equip them with better equipment.
Currently the Russians have a superior rate of fire of one to five, one to six. Ukrainians will never be able to fully compensate for this situation in the future. Therefore, to regain the initiative, the Ukrainians must establish superiority in effectiveness. Therefore, they have to be able to attack faster and better than the Russians, especially with their long-range weapons.
The second important aspect to compensate for personal inferiority is comprehensive technological superiority. The Ukrainians need weapons systems that have greater effective combat range than those of the Russians, while also effectively protecting their crews so that they can be reused even if the combat vehicle is destroyed. They do not want to and cannot burn tens of thousands of men for each conquest of a small town, as the Russians do, but must use superior weapons systems to try to impose local superiority on a tactical level, which then results in breakthroughs.
The third long-term crucial point is the establishment of the superiority of the Ukrainian leadership. This means being able to assess a situation faster than the enemy, with superior command structures and capable battlefield staffs, and then making the right decision and implementing it faster than the Russian counterpart. Because these are the Russians' weak points. They do not have large quantities of precision weapons, high technology and well-trained command personnel. They are characterized more by their superior rate of fire and slow pace of operations.
Shocked: territories occupied by Russia
“That’s not going to win this war.”
tagesschau.de: The EU intends to supply the promised one million pieces of artillery ammunition, at least until the end of the year.
Remel: Here I must say very clearly: you will not win this war with a million additional rounds of artillery ammunition. They were already promised for spring. It is a huge problem for the Ukrainian General Staff to calculate with a million bullets and only get somewhere between 300,000 and 500,000. This also has a strategic dimension because the Ukrainian General Staff obviously cannot trust the word given by the West.
The Russian army now fires around 10,000 rounds of ammunition per day. So you can extrapolate how long a million rounds is enough just to equalize the Russian rate of fire. That's less than three months. And in that time they will not win this war. This is why, in my opinion, effective technology and leadership superiority are more crucial and more realistic to implement in the medium term than a reversal of fire superiority.
tagesschau.de: How confident are you that this can be done?
Remel: This is a political issue. After the Munich Security Conference, there are new efforts. The crucial question is: Will the West create a political consensus to support Ukraine with everything it needs? Although I am skeptical about this issue, I still have hope.
What a difference Taurus rockets would make
tagesschau.de: At the Munich Security Conference, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky called for more efforts from the West. The debate in this country is currently mainly about the delivery of “Taurus” cruise missiles. What strategic advantage would this give Ukraine?
Remel: Basically, no weapons system will determine the outcome of the war, not even the “Taurus” cruise missile. However, it is of great value to the Ukrainian armed forces because it has a high penetrating power compared to the other cruise missiles supplied. In addition to attacking supply lines and command posts outside of artillery range, it is particularly suitable for attacking particularly robust targets.
Originally designed to combat bunkers, the “Taurus” would be suitable, for example, for destroying the Kerch bridge. It links Crimea, which is so important to Russia, with the Russian mainland and would be the only remaining supply route in the event of a successful Ukrainian advance into the Melitopol-Berdyansk area. Such a scenario would present Putin with a strategic dilemma, but this example also makes it clear that Taurus alone cannot force such a situation.
Does “boiling the frog” work?
tagesschau.de: In some parts of the West, however, there are doubts about what a Russian defeat would mean for the country's stability. What role does this play in supporting Ukraine?
Remel: I believe this concern is at least partially justified and relatively pronounced, especially in the US, but it is ultimately speculation. The US wants to avoid at all costs that this conflict advances into the territory of the NATO alliance, whether conventionally or nuclearly. It would automatically trigger the Article 5 alliance case and force the US to redirect its strategic focus, now on the Asia-Pacific region, back to the European continent.
One possible US approach could be to provide limited military aid to Ukraine in order to avoid inflicting the shock of a catastrophic military defeat on the Russians, while also signaling to them that they cannot achieve their strategic objectives militarily. Such an approach is also described as “boiling the frog”. Figuratively, this means: I place a frog in a pot of water and slowly increase the temperature. This means that the frog doesn't realize it's boiling and doesn't jump out of the pan. This strategy could prevent the Russians from exploiting their growing superiority over Ukraine.
A fundamental strategic question in this context that is rarely discussed in Germany is: What is the final geostrategic scenario of this war? Will Putin accept military defeat? This is talked about relatively rarely. Instead, the report focuses on strategically almost insignificant ground gains or losses of a few kilometers. The Americans have not yet clearly publicly stated which scenario should prevail at the end of the war. And this discussion does not take place in this way in European countries either.
We always talk about the need to support Ukraine to win this war. But what does this victory really mean? The Ukrainians are clear about this and say: We want the 1991 borders back, including Crimea. But what happens if this doesn't work? And why isn't the West doing everything it can to ensure that Ukraine can achieve its goal? Significantly greater efforts are needed by the West to expel hundreds of thousands of Russian troops from Crimea and eastern Ukraine. We should also not forget that if Ukraine succeeds, there is no guarantee that Putin or his successor will not try again. Even after the end of the war, Ukraine will continue to depend on military, diplomatic and economic support from the West.
The interview was conducted by Eckart Aretz, tagesschau.de
Andrea Beer, ARD Kiev, tagesschau, February 24, 2024 6:23 am