AGI – The War in Ukraine definitely confirmed that Centrality of the use of drones in modern conflicts. Unmanned aerial vehicles, now used not only for reconnaissance but also for strikes, have proven their ability to inflict attacks enormous losses for impressive armies, but without a proper defense system. The reason for the centrality of drones in this war was the inability of both sides to take control of the airspace, as both armies were equipped with integrated defense systems. A stalemate that put pressure on Kyiv should pursue a very specific strategy, using drones to compensate for the difference in forces on the field. Ukraine has taken advantage of the advantages of using aircraft, which have become increasingly smaller over the months undetectable by enemy radarAdditionally, it is deadly, cheap, easy to maneuver, and quick to manufacture. In Ukraine, drones have shortened the so-called “chain of death,” i.e. the time that elapses from the identification of the enemy to his destruction. Reconnaissance activities, targeted attacks beyond the lines, enemy surveillance. These are all fundamental strategic activities that have been entrusted to unmanned aircraft in this war. At the same time, the conflict has accelerated research and development of combat drones.
Kyiv has produced and used drones Size of a palmuntil 500 kilo airplane to attack and slow the Russian advance. Moscow entered the field with its army and only later realized the importance of drones in influencing the course of the conflict and paid a heavy price for this delay. Small Ukrainian drones were used in the first year of the conflict Dropping grenades on Russian positionswhile the adults TB2 Bayraktar from Turkish production, They caused hundreds of millions of dollars in damage to the Kremlin's armaments and even sank the Russian ship Moskva. Russian President Vladimir Putin belatedly responded by purchasing hundreds of copies Iranian kamikaze drones, the Shahed-136 which created difficulties for the Ukrainian air defense. But it is precisely the new technologies and the industrial production of these weapons that are the most important map of the future for Kiev.
The Ukrainian government wants to build unmanned aircraft that can strike at distances of up to a thousand kilometers, which would mean attacking targets within Russian borders. Particularly significant is the agreement signed with the Turkish company Baykar, which allows Ukraine to produce components of the notorious TB2. In terms of on-site technologies, the aforementioned TB2 Bayraktars, which arrived from Turkey, were crucial in an early phase of the conflict.
The drones, designed by Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan's son-in-law, are equipped with missiles and heavy weapons and are difficult for Russian radars to identify (as has already happened in Libya, editor's note). They made it possible to hit important targets and break through the airspace that Moscow thought it controlled. Heavy losses forced the Russians to take cover, so the Russian army can now identify and attack these large Turkish drones. Kiev responded by switching to even more massive small drones. According to Ukrainian Deputy Prime Minister Mykhailo Fedorov, the country's internal production reached 300,000 drones in 2023, not counting aircraft received from allied countries. The stated goal is to reach one million drones by 2024, with at least half of the components manufactured in-house and many of them based on conversion of technologies already used for civilian use. An example is First Person View (FPV) drones, typically used for sports competitions and filming, which have been “modernized” at very low cost, are armed with explosives and are designed to hit stationary targets. Although disposable, they have the advantage of being undetectable by Russian radar. Just a year ago, Ukraine produced seven types of drones, today there are around 80. A way to meet the need for weapons and ammunition from abroad, which Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky is once again urgently calling for.
An analysis by the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) that Kiev needs 240,000 bombs a month to counter the Russians suggests the priority drones are for Kiev. The latter, on the other hand, can expect a production of 125 tanks per month. Moscow can count on an ammunition stockpile five times larger than Ukraine's. Numbers that give an idea of how much this war is straining Ukraine's air defense, which is becoming increasingly fluid due to the use of drones on the one hand and the powerful Russian war production on the other. Drones have primarily replaced tanks and are much faster and easier to produce than the latter and missiles that can hit at long distances. However, Putin took action and responded with the Russian-made Orion, Eleron-3, Orlan-10 and Lancet drones; However, sanctions imposed by Western countries have slowed Russian domestic production. The Russian leader was forced to resort to Iranian Shaheed-136 drones, which can carry 45 kilos of explosives. A recent investigation found that Russia has built a factory in the Tatarstan region, 800 km from Moscow, and plans to build 6,000 Iranian-style drones by 2025, which will be renamed Geran-2.
The race to produce drones was accompanied by the development of anti-aircraft systems. Turkish TB2 drones no longer play the fundamental role they played in the first months of the conflict precisely because, as already mentioned, Moscow has known how to intercept them. The defense systems of both countries have made it possible to shoot down thousands of drones, but these are very expensive devices and missiles that can often be used to shoot down drones and cost several hundred euros. Now there is also an issue between Kiev and Moscow about producing an anti-aircraft gun that is cheaper than the target. The conflict continues not only on the battlefield, but also in the field of development and investments aimed at increasing the level of “electronic warfare”, which is currently the fastest way to contain damage and losses caused by drones and that to change the balance of power. Russia currently appears to be focused on the superiority of its air force and improving its drones; on the contrary, Ukraine continues to develop economical and quickly produced solutions. However, if Moscow really succeeds in producing 6,000 Iranian-style drones within a year, it could make up for an inferiority that is currently costing it dearly. However, Ukrainian production has proven rapid and diverse, and appropriate use of the new “smart” drones could pose serious difficulties for the already slow Russian advance in the coming months.